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PRIVATE LAW
competence of the court.22 Lack of diversity of citizenship23
caused the dismissal of that suit, and it was therefore not a court
of competent jurisdiction, so that the timely filing alone did not
create an interruption of the prescription.
Choice of Cause of Action
In some kinds of situations, a person may have a choice of
two causes of actions, and if his claim for damages results from
breach of contract, he can avoid the one-year prescription against
torts. Sometimes a person may have two distinct claims with
an independent separate prescription running against each. A
decision which could create many hardship cases was rendered
in Williamson v. S.S. Kresge Co.24 An injured employee accepted
a permanent disability compensation award for a certain length
of time until it was discovered that these payments were being
made in error since the -occupation and the business were not
hazardous. The ensuing suit in tort was dismissed on the ground
of one-year liberative prescription which had meanwhile lapsed.
It may be technically correct to say that ignorance of the law is
no excuse and that the employee has slept on his right. There-
fore, since a suit in tort is precluded where a claim is covered
by the workman's compensation act,25 it may be necessary for
an injured person to get a judicial determination in order to
protect himself against the risk of an erroneous award.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Minority Suspension
The writer has already discussed at considerable length the
Supreme Court's decision in Mire v. Hawkins,1 in which the
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3518 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950).
23. One of the defendants as well as the plaintiffs were citizens of Louisiana.
24. 186 So. 2d.696 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 580, 187
So. 2d 741 (1966).
25. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966). The court's decision on the issue on
which writs were granted is thoroughly discussed in Hardy, Comments on Mire
v. Hawkins, 27 LA. L. REv. 5 (1966).
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application of the obstacle concept first articulated in Boddie v.
Drewett2 was overruled and the court concluded that unit drill-
ing operations conducted on a compulsory unit but off the servi-
tude tract would have the effect of interrupting prescription.
The extent of any such interruption in the case of partial inclu-
sion of a servitude tract in such a unit has not been definitively
determined. However, prior jurisprudence regarding the extent
of a use by unit production 3 suggests the conclusion that the
interruption would be limited to the included acreage.
The Afire case was accepted on writs by the Supreme Court
only on the question of the obstacle rule. 4 However, another
extremely important aspect of the case was dealt with by the
court of appeal. 5 This concerned the interpretation and applica-
tion of R.S. 9:5805, which abolished suspensions of liberative
prescription in favor of minors and others under disability inso-
far as mineral interests are concerned. The record disclosed that
when the servitudes in question were created in 1946 and 1947,
the plaintiffs were minors. At that time in history the minority
suspension was still operative. Two of the plaintiffs, however,
reached majority in 1948, and the third became a major in 1950,
the year in which the act became effective. The 1950 enactment
provided in part that it was "intended to and does affect pres-
ently existing mineral or royalty rights; however, any minor or
other person under legal disability whose rights are affected
hereby, shall have a period of one year from the effective date
hereof within which to exercise such rights." Counsel for the
plaintiffs argued that as the provision giving the one-year period
in which to exercise existing and affected rights applied only to
''any minor or other person under legal disability," this should
be read as meaning that the statute affected only persons under
disability and enjoying the benefit of a suspension at the time
of the effective date of the act. It was urged on behalf of the
defendants that the act should be applied retroactively to wipe
out all suspensions the benefits of which any parties might have
been enjoying on the effective date of the act, even though their
disability might have terminated previously.
2. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
3. E.g., Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La. 41,
87 So..2d 721 (1956) ; Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So. 2d 11 (1956).
The Jumonville decision was cited with approval by the majority in the Mire
case. Thus it seems that there is at least some basis for prediction that the earlier
cases regarding the effect of unit production will be followed.
4. Mire v. Hawkins, 248 La. 367, 178 So. 2d 657 (1965).
5. 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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The court of appeal determined that the act was retroactive
in the manner urged by defendants and, therefore, that even
though the suspensions which at least two of the plaintiffs en-
joyed had begun and terminated prior to the effective date of
the act, the retroactive effect of the act was to deprive them of
the benefit of any such suspensions.
In evaluating the decision, one may consider five alternative
fact situations: (1) A, an owner of mineral rights, who was a
minor on the effective date of the 1950 enactment and whose
interest had been outstanding for less than ten years at that
time; (2) B, an owner of mineral rights, who was a minor on
the effective date of the 1950 enactment and whose interest had
been outstanding in excess of ten years as of that date; (3) C, an
owner of mineral rights, in whose favor a suspension had com-
menced and terminated by reason of attainment of majority
prior to the effective date of the act but whose mineral rights
had been outstanding as of that date for less than ten years;
(4) D, an owner of mineral rights, in whose favor a suspension
of prescription had commenced and terminated by attainment
of majority prior to the effective date of the act but whose
interest had been outstanding for more than ten years as of that
date; (5) E, an owner of mineral rights, in whose favor a sus-
pension of prescription had commenced and terminated by rea-
son of the attainment of majority prior to the effective date of
the act but in whose favor prescription had been interrupted
or suspended for some other cause by reason of which it was
still outstanding as of the effective date of the act.
It seems clear that in the first and second cases the statute
was clearly intended to deny to minors or others under disability
as of the effective date of the act the benefit of any then exist-
ing suspension of prescription by reason of such disability. In
this respect, there can be no question as to the correctness of
the court's decision. There is, however, difference between the
two cases. In the first case, that of an interest outstanding for
less than ten years as of the effective date of the act, it seems
clear that the original prescriptive date will still be applicable
if that date was more than one year from the effective date of
the act. If that date was less than one year from the effective
date of the act, it seems that the interpretation given to the
statute requires that the minor or other disabled person be given
one year from the effective date of the act.
1967]
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Insofar as the third and fourth cases are concerned, the deci-
sion means that the act is applicable retrospectively to deprive
the minor or other previously disabled person of a previously
accrued suspension of prescription. There are, however, differ-
ences in application, similar to those as between the first and
second cases. If the interest had been outstanding for less than
ten years as of the effective date of the statute and the prescrip-
tive date was more than one year from that date, the original
prescriptive date would apparently apply. If, however, the in-
terest had been outstanding for more than ten years as of the
effective date of the enactment or if the prescriptive date was
less than one year from the effective date, the owner of the min-
eral rights in question would have had one year from the effec-
tive date in which to exercise his rights.
Deferring for a moment discussion of the fifth fact situation,
evaluation of this portion of the decision is somewhat difficult,
but it can be said that the plaintiffs whose interests were af-
fected adversely by this interpretation certainly had a reasonable
position in the matter. In the first place, their argument that
the statute by its own terms expressed the intent that it be ap-
plicable only to those who were minors or otherwise disabled at
the time of the enactment seems well founded. Further, it seems
that logical arguments can be made to the effect that the benefit
of the prior rule of property had already vested in that the
suspension had begun and terminated and that to deprive them of
the rights so vested might be unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the court's position is not entirely without
logic. It may be argued, by way of example, that if the legisla-
ture passed a statute altering the prescriptive term of all min-
eral servitudes by decreasing it to seven years, the act would
not be struck down as unconstitutional as the statute is merely
remedial or procedural in nature," and as long as persons af-
fected are protected by giving them a reasonable period in which
to exercise their rights, no constitutional argument can be
successfully asserted. Similarly, the interpretation given R.S.
9:5805 might be said to mean that mineral interests existing
solely by reason of a disability suspension as of the effective
date of the act, regardless of whether the suspension is still
existent or has previously terminated, may validly be affected
6. United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951); Whitney
National Bank v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947).
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by the statute as long as a reasonable time for protection is
allowed.
Yet, the interpretation given the statute may, perhaps, be
more closely analogous to saying that if X used a mineral servi-
tude in 1940 and again in 1949, the legislature may validly say
that the prescriptive period is only five years and that the
second use, therefore, was of no effect in preserving the servi-
tude interest. In short, the commencement and termination of
the suspension might be viewed as creating a vested right. Cer-
tainly, the court's decision is deserving of sober consideration
by the Supreme Court at some future date, and it was somewhat
of a surprise that the grant of writs did not include a review of
this portion of the opinion.
The fifth fact situation set out above envisions the possibility
that a suspension of prescription might have been operative at
some time prior to the effective date of the act but that during
or subsequent to the period of the suspension the rights in ques-
tion were used on behalf of the minor or other disabled person
prior to the date of the act.
Although the court was not called upon to decide this ques-
tion, its decision leaves some room for doubt concerning it if
read literally. Thus, it seems appropriate to observe that an
interpretation of this statute to deprive any mineral owner who
had enjoyed the benefit of a suspension in the past or was en-
joying it at the time of the act of the benefits of a prior use
would unquestionably be wrong.
Servitude - Royalty Distinction
The decision in Uzee v. Bollinger7 is one of two decided dur-
ing the past term concerning which comment by the writer
might be unseemly because of participation in the litigation. In
view of this fact, no discussion will be undertaken. The reader
is referred to the discussion of this case by Mr. Marlin Risinger
in the 1966 Mineral Law Institute" for his evaluation of the
decision, which involves important determinations regarding the
servitude-royalty distinction and the relationship of executive
and non-executive mineral interests.
7. 178 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
8. THIRTEENTH INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAw 133 (1966).
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Severance Damages
In State, Sabine River Authority v. Salter,9 land belonging
to plaintiff had been expropriated for use in construction of the
Toledo Bend Dam and reservoir project. The mineral rights
were reserved to defendant. 10 In addition to contesting the valua-
tion of the land expropriated, defendant sought damages to the
reserved mineral rights allegedly caused by the ultimate inunda-
tion of the property and the imposition of certain restrictions
by the Sabine River Authority on exercise of the reserved min-
eral rights. Initially, the court of appeal, harmoniously with the
district court, concluded that the rights reserved by defendant
were not in the nature of a separate mineral estate. Rather they
constituted a "perpetual servitude." The authority urged that as
only a servitude rather than ownership of the minerals in place
had been reserved, the value of the servitude was too speculative
to permit an award for damages. Further, the authority urged
that although damages might be allowable if oil or gas were
presently being produced on the land, no damages were allow-
able as there was no production, and the nearest wells were
several miles away. Thus, the authority concluded that the
present value of the mineral servitude was too speculative to
permit proof of damages.
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that the mineral
rights in question had a present market value for leasing and
that such value would be destroyed as a result of the inundation
of the land and imposition of restrictions on operations by the
authority. The evidence demonstrated rather clearly that the
plaintiff's position as to a present value for leasing was correct.
Regarding the question of whether the expropriation proceedings
would destroy that value, the evidence further revealed that oil
and gas production in the Sabine Parish area is from a very
"tight" chalk formation at a relatively shallow level with low
per well production. Expert testimony was to the effect that
the great cost of barges and other equipment for water bottom
operations would render the drilling or production of such wells
economically unfeasible. Additional costs might be incurred as
a result of restrictions by the authority in an effort to keep the
waters of the reservoir free of waste oil and other residue.
9. 184 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
10. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 45.
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The court of appeal found that the present lease value of the
mineral rights was $11.00 per acre and held that defendant was
entitled to be compensated accordingly. In fixing the damages,
the court expressed a preference for the notion that the appro-
priate method was a determination of the value of the mineral
rights prior to the expropriation and the value subsequent to
expropriation. As the whole of the then market value would be
destroyed by the expropriation, the full amount of $11.00 per
acre was awarded. However, it was observed that as a practical
matter in that particular case it made no difference whether
the $11.00 per acre were figured as a part of the value of the
land as a whole or merely computed as severance damages to
the retained mineral rights.
The court was clearly correct in its preference for the sever-
ance damages method of computing the award. As a theoretical
matter, the lease value of mineral rights is not necessarily the
value of the mineral rights themselves on an open market. Al-
though in an individual case such a method of valuation might
be reasonable, there is a clear conceptual distinction to be made.
What was lost by the expropriation was not the entire value of
the mineral rights but the loss of the present leasing value for
exploitation of known producing horizons in the area. This is
an item of severance damage. Conceivably, in the future deeper
discoveries may be made and drilling techniques may be evolved
which would make exploration of different, more productive
sands economically feasible. This prospective value is, of course,
speculative, but the defendant clearly had not been deprived of
any such prospective value. All that was lost was the chance of
exploitation of known producing horizons in the area under pres-
ent conditions.
Unlawful Agreement To Extend Servitude
In Kirkland v. Faulhaber," plaintiff sued for specific per-
formance of a contract to sell 160 acres of land adjoining lands
of his own. Defendant had written plaintiff offering to sell the
property for $75.00 per acre with a "reservation of mineral
rights for ten years plus a ten year extension." Plaintiff ac-
cepted the offer by mail as it had been made. However, ten
days after the offer was written, defendant wrote that she had
accepted another offer. Defendant testified that she did not
11. 175 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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"think" she would have sold the property unless she could have
obtained the ten-year extension of the mineral reservation and
that she would not have sold the property for cash because she
wanted payment on a long-term interest bearing basis. The dis-
trict court ordered specific enforcement of the contract to sell,
and defendant appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment
of the lower court. Under the facts, the conclusion was deemed
inescapable that the extension of the mineral reservation, as
proposed by the defendant and accepted by plaintiff, had not
been established as a principal cause for making the contract.
Thus, the contract could not be avoided for error of law. De-
fendant also contended that she had not consented to the cash
payment of the price. Common usage and ordinary rules of
interpretation were said to indicate that an offer to sell prop-
erty at a designated price per acre contemplates payment in
cash. It appeared obvious that in making the offer defendant
did not consider terms of credit as being a principal cause.
Otherwise she would have specified such a provision. Further,
this was not deemed to be a real factor inasmuch as defendant
later purported to sell the property for cash. The court there-
fore ordered specific performance of the agreement exactly as
written, with the provision for extension of the reservation of
the mineral rights. The extension was not deemed illegal, void,
or prohibited, but simply unenforceable by law. Despite the fact
that plaintiff would be under no legal obligation to comply with
the agreement for extension, it could not be said that he could
not voluntarily grant the extension.
Considering the facts of the case, there can be no quarrel
whatsoever with the result achieved. As a matter of strict theory,
however, it does seem that the agreement to permit a ten-year
extension of the mineral rights to be reserved by the vendor
should be considered as being a nullity rather than merely un-
enforceable. The unenforceable obligation is usually one which
is, nevertheless, supported by a natural obligation. 1 2 Such, how-
12. Planiol observes that natural obligations do not ordinarily survive a null
act because nullities are usually founded on moral reasons and natural obligations
are similarily founded on a moral imperative. Thus, as a basic proposition, it is
illogical that the law would for moral reasons consider an act null and at the
same time find any surviving natural or moral obligation. See 2 PLANIOL, TREATISE
ON CIVIL LAW, (TRANSLATION By LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 342
(1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL].
In the category of unenforceable obligations, the principal examples are con-
[Vol. XXVII
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ever, does not appear to be the case with an obligation attempt-
ing to avoid the application of the prescription of nonuse to a
mineral servitude. This is against established public policy. 13
In discussing the theory of nullities, Planiol divides nullities into
two categories, the "null" act and the "annullable" act.14 He
states that the "nullity by operation of law is the true nullity,
which results from what the law forbids."' 5 Such a nullity may
result solely from the spirit of the law even where there is no
specific text. 16 It is null as regards everybody because its nullity
is based upon a consideration of general interest.1 7 Louisiana
jurisprudence clearly suggests that agreements of the kind in
question are contrary to public policy and should be regarded
as nullities rather than mere unenforceable obligations. 8
As noted, the criticism levelled at the court's reasoning is
purely a matter of theory because a conclusion that the attempted
extension agreement was a nullity would not have required a
different result. Under the facts of the case, it appears that
the court was clearly justified in its determination that the
ten-year extension of the mineral rights was not a principal
or motivating cause of the vendor. Therefore, even though that
particular portion of the contract might be regarded as a nullity,
there would be no basis for regarding the entire contract as a
nullity.
Use By Unit Operations
The decision in Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen 9 is one of the
most important in recent years. It disposes of a question which
has lurked in the mineral property law since the courts began
tracts by those incapable of acting when executed in full possession of their
faculties, such as a minor, and obligations on which liberative prescription has
accrued. In both instances the obligation is merely unenforceable, but a natural
obligation survives. 2 PLANIOL § 343.
13. E.g., Hicks v. Clark. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954) (dealing with
reversionary right) ; Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co., 190
La. 84, 181 So. 865 (1.938) (deliberate transfer to minor to avoid prescription) ;
Patton's Heirs v. Moseley. 186 La. 1088, 173 So. 772 (1937) (transfer to minor).
14. See 1 PLANIOL §§ 326-335. particularly § 335. In the cited discussion
Planiol also goes into the theory of the "inexistent act." However, he maintains
that the so-called "inexistent act" is not really a nullity and that the dual concept
of "null" and "annullable" acts has survived in France. For an analysis of acts
null by operation of law ("null" acts) see 1 PLANIOL §§ 336-339. Regarding
"annullable acts" see I PLANIOL §§ 340-344.
15. 1 PLANIOL § 336.
16. Id. at § 337.
17. Id. at § 339.
18. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
19. 249 La. 520, 187 So. 2d 720 (1966). See also the appellate decision in
179 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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wrestling with the problem of the effect of unit operations on
the prescription of nonuse accruing against mineral servitude
tracts included in unitized areas. Briefly, the issue of note was
whether drilling operations conducted on a compulsory unit in-
cluding only a portion of a mineral servitude tract but from a
location on the tract in question would have the effect of inter-
rupting prescription only as to that portion within the unit or
as to the entire servitude. The court of appeal and the Supreme
Court both gave full effect to the use. This accords with the
writer's previously expressed views and seems sound in every
respect.20
In terms of theory, the decision lays to rest, at least sub-
stantially, the question raised by certain earlier decisions regard-
ing use by unit operations as to whether the issuance of a unitiza-
tion order has the technical legal effect of "dividing" a partially
included servitude in the fullest sense of that word as a term
of legal art.2 ' The Trunkline decision certainly indicates that
this is not the case. The decision should further illustrate the
validity of the writer's expressed thesis that the unitization cases
have dealt with problems of rules of use applicable to unit opera-
tions and not with conflicts between conservation orders and
private contracts or with any actual division of servitude tracts
affected.22 In rationalizing the result the Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Fournet, held that the rule of use applicable to
operations conducted on the servitude premises has been clearly
established for many years. To deny the servitude owner the
benefit of this rule, which would clearly have been applicable
but for the question raised by the unitization order, would, in
the Chief Justice's mind, have raised serious constitutional
problems.2 ,
20. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on
the Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REV. 824, 855
(1965).
21. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La. 41, 87
So. 2d 721 (1956); Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869. 87 So. 2d 111 (1956);
Frey v. Miller, 165 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 844,
167 So.2d 669.
22. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices
on the Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REv. 824,
848-49 (1965).
23. "Clearly, therefore, any order of the Commissioner not necessary for the
conservation of oil and gas resources of this State or to prevent their waste or
one that would unnecessarily deprive an owner of his rights to property, as owner
or under contract, would be illegal and unconstitutional for the Constitution of
1921 clearly provides that (1) 'private property shall not be taken or damaged
except for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid,'
(Article I, Section 2) and prohibits the passing of any law impairing the obliga-
PRIVATE LAW
It is noteworthy that the record of the case presented a
means by which the issue of major importance could have been
avoided. The evidence clearly reveals that the drilling operations
in question had been conducted for the purpose of, and had re-
sulted in, the testing of nonunitized sands as well as that which
was unitized. Thus, it could have been held that the operations
in the nonunitized sands had clearly effected an interruption of
prescription as to the entire tract. It is significant that the court
chose to grapple with the case on the more difficult, and mean-
ingful, issue of the effect of the unit operations.
The Trunkline decision has been criticized recently by one
able practitioner 24 on the ground that the result will force op-
erators to consider well locations based upon property lines
rather than giving geological considerations their proper deter-
minative force. The writer has some doubts concerning this point
of view. It is difficult to conceive that in contemplating expendi-
tures of the kind required for development today property lines
will play an undue part in determining well location. True, if
one of two equally desirable locations, judged from the technical
side, will have the effect of permitting an interruption of pre-
scription on the entirety of a tract under lease to the operator
and the other will not, the choice would obviously be in favor
of the greater effect on prescription if the operator's rights
were truly dependent upon continued life of the servitude inter-
est in question. However, it seems unlikely that any major risk
in completion of a producing well will be undertaken solely on
tion of contracts, or the divestiture of 'vested rights * * * unless for purposes of
public utility, and for just and adequate compensation previously paid.' (Article
IV, Section 15). Such order would also be in violation of the Constitution of
the United States, which prohibits the states from passing any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, (Article I, Section 10) as well as the taking of private
property without just compensation, (the Fifth Amendment)." Trunkline Gas
Co. v. Steen, 187 So. 2d 720, 724 (La. 1966).
24. l)uvieilh, Recent Jurisprudence I, FOURTEENT ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
MINERAL L.AW (1967). Mr. Duvieilh states: "It is difficult to see how where
the unit well is actually located should influence any policy which would require
either a division or a nondivision of a mineral servitude, or royalty, by a forced
unit. Any such policy seemingly should result in either a division or nondivision
regardless of where the unit well is located. Otherwise, where the unit well is
located would produce different legal effects on the nonunitized portions of min-
eral servitudes and the corresponding duration of mineral leases affecting such
nonunitized portions." With all due respect to Mr. l)uvieilh's experience and
undoubted ability, it is submitted that lie makes the mistake of failing to perceive
that the unitization cases involve problems of rules (,f use and not problems of
"division or nondivision," as he puts it. This is precisely the error into which
the courts originally fell and which has caused such a great deal of difficulty.
See Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on the
Louisiana Mineral Servitude and .lineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REV. 824, 855 (1965).
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the ground that operations will have a greater effect on pre-
scription if conducted from another site. The problems suggested
may cost particular operators some additional money in attempt-
ing to acquire lease rights from the expectant landowner, but
this type of problem is not uncommon under previously existing
conditions.
The expressed view that the Trunkline case is wrongly de-
cided because it brings undue consideration of property lines is
subject to further criticism in that it fails to consider the pos-
sibility that Trunkline is right and those decisions limiting the
effect of unit operations solely to acreage included in a com-
pulsory unit 25 may be wrong. If operations affecting prescrip-
tion were given the uniform effect of interrupting prescription
on the entirety of any servitude tract affected by the unitization
order, there would be no reason whatsoever for considering prop-
erty lines in choosing optimum well locations in the absence of
special contractual provisions. The writer has also previously
suggested that if unit operations are to be given any effect on
prescription, that effect should be a full interruption of prescrip-
tion on the entire tract.2 This is not to say that such effect must
be given to both drilling operations, regardless of location, and
to production, but great benefits in terms of simplicity of titles
and of judicial administration of the property system as well as
harmony with property rules affecting mineral leases and the
conservation act would accrue from adoption of the basic prin-
ciple that any interruption of prescription is an interruption as
to the whole of the tract in question unless the landowner and
servitude owner expressly agree to the contrary. Power to vary
this rule restrictively by convention should clearly lie within the
range of freedom of contract.
MINERAL LEASES
Damages
Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp.27 involved a claim for damages to land and timber by an
oil and gas lessee. The lease in question contained an express
25. See the authorities cited in note 21 supra.
26. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on
Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REv. 824, 858, 871(1965).
27. 177 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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clause making lessee responsible 'for all damages to land, crops,
timber, and improvements caused by its operations. The court
awarded damages for saw logs and pulpwood and for restoration
of the surface where disturbed by well locations and roads. The
land in question was for the most part low timberland subject
to the overflow and was cut by bayous, lakes, ravines, and log-
roads, and the court observed that the amount of damages
claimed by plaintiff for cost of restoration might actually ex-
ceed the value of the land and indicated doubt that plaintiff
would use any award of damages to restore such property. Thus,
it did not fully satisfy the plaintiff's claim. The court also de-
nied damages for loss of future growth of small timber and
for the fees of expert appraisers used to estimate the damage
to timber. Insofar as the damage to future timber growth was
concerned the court held that the lease contract did not contem-
plate damage payments for anything but merchantable timber.
Future growth was considered too speculative, complicated, and
conjectural.
The court's decision appears to be sound, and there is no
unusual aspect of the case warranting further comment.
Right To Remove Equipment
Silberman v. Beaubouef28 concerned a suit by an oil operator
against his erstwhile lessor for an injunction prohibiting de-
fendant from obstructing or embarrassing plaintiff's efforts in
removing certain drilling equipment and casing from the location
of a depleted well. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining
order. However, on the hearing for the preliminary injunction,
the lower court denied injunctive relief. The court of appeal
affirmed the lower court, noting that the defendant disclaimed
any objection to the removal of any equipment at the time of
trial. The dispute involved a contention by defendant that plain-
tiff was obligated to fill in certain pits on defendant's land.
However, in denying injunctive relief, the trial judge commented
that it did not appear that there would be any further interfer-
ence, if in fact there had been previous interference. The court
had for consideration the question whether the trial judge had
abused his discretion in refusing injunctive relief and quite prop-
erly found no abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
28. 175 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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Unit Operations
The plaintiff in Auzenne v. Lawrence Oil Co. 29 sought can-
cellation of a mineral lease for failure to pay royalty, which in
this instance was actually a shut-in payment under a lease treat-
ing such payments as "production" within the meaning of the
habendum clause. The circumstances giving rise to the dispute
were that a portion of the lease premises was included in a drill-
ing unit for a potential oil sand. Operations were conducted on
the unit but off the leased premises. The unitized oil sand was
found unproductive. However, the well was completed as a gas
condensate well in another sand which was later unitized. Prior
to the second unitization, however, defendant lessee tendered
delay rentals. Plaintiff refused the payment, contending that
lessee should have made a shut-in royalty payment. The court
reasoned that at the time the payment was tendered, the lease
was not being maintained by drilling operations or by actual
production. The well had been completed in a sand and at a
location which was not at that time unitized to include any of
the lease premises. Therefore, no shut-in payment was due, and
the lease could only have been maintained by means of the delay
rental payment. There appears to be no question as to the cor-
rectness of this analysis.
Operating Agreements
In Southwest Gas Prod. Co. v. Creslenn Oil Co. 3 0 plaintiff
instituted a concursus proceeding seeking distribution of pro-
ceeds from production attributable to certain tracts within a
fieldwide unit. The principal issue in the case arose from the
fact that two groups of claimants had, prior to establishment of
the fieldwide unit, executed an operating agreement covering a
described half-section of land. In the agreement, claimants ex-
pressed an expectation that the tract in question would be uni-
tized by the Commissioner of Conservation and provided that
in the event some other unit area should be established for the
unitized sand, the provisions of the agreement would be ap-
plicable to the other unit area. Although the half-section in
question was unitized, the originally formed unit was later re-
formed to exclude a portion of the half-section. By the terms of
the fieldwide unitization order the well located in the area cov-
29. 179 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
30. 181 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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ered by the operating agreement was shut in and that area of
the half-section included in the fieldwide unit was assigned par-
ticipation according to a formula weighing productive acre feet
and surface acreage. Basically, the opposing claims centered
around a determination of whether the tract participations as-
signed under the conservation order in some manner superseded
the provisions of the operating agreement. The lower court held
that the provisions of the operating agreement regarding the
sharing of production were not abrogated by the conservation
order.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The action of
the Commissioner was purely conservatory in nature. His allo-
cation of production was necessary for the protection of land-
owners and was not intended to affect the validity and enforce-
ment of private agreements previously entered into. At the time
the operating agreement was executed there could be no assur-
ance that all of the tract would be productive. All parties were
experienced operators familiar with the possible hazards and
benefits involved in the proposed operations. Implicit in the
agreement was recognition of the fact that the distribution of
costs upon the basis of surface acreage was, in the opinion of
the parties to the agreement, equal to the proceeds which might
result from sharing production upon the same basis. The change
in position evidenced by the claim in this suit simply demon-
strated the infallibility of hindsight as opposed to the unknown
and imponderable elements which lie outside the realm of ascer-
tainable knowledge at the time of the negotiation of any contract.
.It had been urged that the parties to the operating agreement
contracted only with reference to the well drilled on the tract in
question, which was later shut in as a part of the field unit op-
erations, with production being allocated to the portion of the
tract covered by the operating agreement from other wells. The
court rejected this contention, applying R.S. 30:10(A) (1) (b),
providing that the portion of the production allocated to the own-
er of each tract included in a drilling unit formed by a pooling
order shall, when produced, be considered as if it had been pro-
duced from his tract by a well drilled thereon. Although the
statute specifically relates to drilling units formed under R.S.
30:9, the court stated it could find no ground for distinction in
its application to a field-wide unit such as that created by the
Commissioner in this case.
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In terms of the legal principles applied, the writer has no
criticism of this case to offer. Conceivably, the facts of the case
might be arguable. However, the decision ultimately turned upon
a question of construction of the operating agreement in accor-
dance with the "intent of the parties." The court's reliance on
the prior decision in Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Southern Nat-
ural Gas Co.,31 which relied in turn on Arkansas-Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Southwest Natural Production Co. 32 appears to have
been well placed under the circumstances.
Division Orders
In Kaufman v. Arnaudville Co.3 plaintiff lessor sought can-
cellation of a mineral lease on the ground that a declared unit in-
cluding a portion of the lease premises had not been validly
formed, resulting in expiration of the lease. The pooling clause
of the lease in question provided that "any unit formed by Lessee
hereunder may be created either prior to the drilling or after the
completion of the unit well." Lessee executed and filed the unit
declaration during the time the well was being drilled. Plaintiff
therefore contended that under the terms of the pooling clause
and in accord with prior decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court interpreting and applying such clauses strictly,34 the unit
was invalid. Therefore, the unit operations, conducted on the
unit but off the lease premises, were alleged not to have main-
tained the lease. Sporadic unit operations attempting to achieve
completion were conducted beyond the end of the primary term.
Prior to abandonment of operations in the first unit, but after
the end of the primary term, a second unit was formed by dec-
laration in a manner which plaintiff admitted was in accordance
with the terms of the pooling clause and would have been valid
had the lease remained in force. A third unit including a por-
tion of the plaintiff's property was formed. Both of these unit
wells were completed as dual producers of oil. A division order
was circulated to plaintiff providing, in part, that in considera-
tion of the execution of the order by other royalty owners in the
unit and in consideration of the payments to be made to the
royalty owners under the terms of the division order, each roy-
31. 234 La. 939, 102 So. 2d 223 (1958).
32. 221 La. 608, 60 So. 2d 9 (1952).
33. 186 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), writs denied, 249 La. 575, 187
So. 2d 739.
34. See Mallet v. Union Oil & Gas Corp., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957)
Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
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alty owner, including plaintiff, acknowledged that the lease exe-
cuted by him and accurately described in the order was fully
effective at the time the order was executed and that each signa-
tory party ratified the unit. The record revealed that the plain-
tiff was an able and experienced oil man and that prior to execu-
tion of the division order plaintiff had made rather extensive
inquiries concerning the formation of the units, including the
first one, and the operations conducted on them. Defendant con-
tended that in view of these facts, plaintiff executed the division
order acknowledging the validity of the lease and ratifying the
establishment of the first producing unit with full knowledge of
the facts and should be held estopped to deny the validity of the
lease. The trial court sustained the position of the defendant,
holding that the division order had the effect of estopping plain-
tiff from denying the validity of the mineral lease.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court.
In so holding, it did not admit the validity of plaintiff's argument
that the lease had expired because the first unit was improperly
formed but held that the estoppel resulting from plaintiff's exe-
cution of the division order made it unnecessary to decide the
issues raised by plaintiff's arguments.
In its opinion on original hearing, the court dealt with the
argument of plaintiff that the division order was by its express
terms revocable and that as plaintiff had repudiated it, it could
not have any effect on the issue of the validity of the lease. In
disposing of this argument, the court remarked that the pro-
visions of the order concerning revocation applied only to the
right of the plaintiff lessor to take production in kind if he so
desired, thus permitting the inference that the order could be
revoked only in the event plaintiff desired to take production in
kind by exercising the option to do so provided in the lease. In a
per curiam opinion denying the application for rehearing, the
court took notice of the fact that plaintiff urged that the court's
remarks had wide and damaging effect on the law regarding di-
vision orders. The court apparently went to some trouble to indi-
cate that it did not intend to be changing the law concerning the
legal effects of division orders, concluding with a re-emphasis of
the facts upon which it based its finding of an estoppel.
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Sale of Working Interests
In Williams v. Morgan,35 plaintiffs sued on a contract to sell
certain working interests to defendant under the terms of which
funds were placed in escrow and were to be delivered to plain-
tiffs if valid assignments were delivered to the escrow agent by
a specified date. Defendants entered into possession of the leases
and operated them during the escrow period. On the specified
date, defendants refused to consummate the sale and demanded
immediate return of the amount in escrow, claiming that plain-
tiffs were guilty of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the
production characteristics of the wells. The case principally in-
volved a determination of fact as to whether defendants had been
misled. The court cited abundant evidence of the precautions
taken by defendants against any probability of a bad investment,
including inspections of conservation department records, in-
spections of the wells themselves, and other precautionary mea-
sures. All of the facts allegedly misrepresented were open and
available to defendants, who were experienced in oil operations.
The court concluded that not only had defendants failed to meet
the high standard of proof required to support allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation but that defendants had not been
misled and had not, in fact, relied on the representations in ques-
tion as a basis for execution of the escrow agreement. Viewing
the facts as recited in the opinion, there can be no quarrel with
the decision. The inference to be drawn from the opinion is that
the court felt defendants had discovered an error in business
judgment and were simply attempting to extricate themselves
from their predicament, which the court properly chose to pro-
hibit.
"Starting a Well"
The proper interpretation of the phrase "start a well" was at
issue in Hilliard v. Franzheim.36 Defendant had agreed to pur-
chase an overriding royalty interest from plaintiff on condition
that plaintiff "start a well" within ninety days of the agreement.
The price was to be paid on notice that the well "had been
spudded." Within the ninety-day period, plaintiff had staked
the location, moved lumber onto it, levelled the site, installed
a culvert and cattle guard, begun construction of a board road
and entered into a drilling contract. The rig was not on location
35. 180 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
36. 180 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
[Vol. XXVII
PRIVATE LAW
and drilling was not begun until, more than ninety days from
the agreement. On the date the rig was moved on, plaintiff sent
defendant an executed royalty deed. Defendant retained the deed
without action until after the well was found to be dry and then
refused to pay the purchase price, arguing that the phrase
"start a well" as used in the agreement meant spudding in. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal properly refused' to sustain de-
fendant's argument and compelled payment of the purchase
price.
Although no criticism can be levelled at the result of this
case, the court does fall into error in making its interpretation
of the phrase "start a well" by stating that that phrase has the
same meaning in the industry as "commence to drill." Actually,
the latter phrase is synonymous with "spudding in" of a well -
that is, the first penetration of the bit. It seems that the court
may have fallen into some confusion in that many commonly
used lease forms use the phrase "commence operations for the
drilling of a well." This, of course, is synonymous with "starting
a well," the term involved in the instant case. It is to be hoped
that this confusion will not be the source of misinterpretation in
the future.
PUBLIC LANDS
School Lands
By this time it is difficult to view the decision in Terrebonne
Parish School Board v. Texaco, Inc.37 as being a "recent deci-
sion." However, it is nevertheless one of considerable note and
disposes of a question which has been troublesome to the state
and the industry for some years. The controversy essentially
revolved around title to navigable water bottoms in school (or
"16th Section") lands. The Terrebonne Parish School Board
and the Louisiana State Mineral Board had granted, conflicting
leases on a "16th Section." The First Circuit Court of Appeal
determined that title to all navigable water bottoms in the state
passed to the State of Louisiana on admission to the Union, 38
whereas title to the school lands did not pass from the federal
government until after the making and approving of surveys.3 9
37. 178 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), writs denied, 248 La. 465, 179
So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 950 (1966).
38. The court relied upon Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845).
39. In reliance upon United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440 (1946).
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Accordingly, although under R.S. 30:152 school boards are au-
thorized to lease "16th Section" and school indemnity lands for
the development and production of minerals, they are not en-
titled to lease the beds of navigable waters within those areas
for such purposes. Extended discussion would contribute little
in the way of enlightenment regarding this decision. It is suf-
ficient to say that the result seems eminently sound.
Water Bottoms
Comment on the merits of the decision rendered by the First
Circuit Court of Appeal in State v. Scott40 is proscribed by the
fact that the author entered the case as counsel for the Scott
group, the losing parties, prior to becoming a member of the
law school faculty and continued to serve in that capacity until
final disposition of the case. The decision is briefly treated by
Professor Dainow in the portion of this symposium dealing with
civil law property and was discussed by Mr. Phillip Wittmann
in the 1967 Mineral Law Institute, the proceedings of which will
be published in the near future. It is sufficient to say that the
decision is of considerable significance in that it is the first
successful engagement in a long and determined war by the
State of Louisiana on the decision rendered in California Co. v.
Price.41 It thus has rather far-reaching effects as it gives the
state a much stronger bargaining position in a number of pres-
ently outstanding disputes with private landholders who have
up to this time been relying on the Price case. That decision, of
course, had given private claimants a man-sized stick to wield in
bargaining with the state for settlement of claims to minerals
in water bottom areas. For those who take the position that it
is better policy that the natural resources in these areas be di-
verted to the state and thus to public use, the Scott case repre-
sents a substantial victory. Private landholding interests seem
to have been put in a defensive position for the'first time in a
number of years.
40. 185 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). Judge Lottinger submitted a
strong dissenting opinion in which Judge Landry concurred, id. at 886.
41. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
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REAL ACTIONS AND OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Real Actions - Necessary Parties
In LeSage v. Union Producing Co.,42 plaintiff, apparently
feeling that previously granted mineral leases on two certain
tracts of land had expired, purchased a one-half mineral interest
from the owner of one of the tracts and secured a full interest
mineral lease from the owner of the other tract. A detailed
statement of the facts would be surplusage in the context of this
discussion as the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of
the case. It is sufficient to note that plaintiff brought an action
seeking to be declared owner of the mineral servitude and min-
eral lease interests in question and to have the previously granted
mineral leases cancelled. Defendants filed exceptions of no cause
of action, no right of action, and nonjoinder of indispensable or
necessary parties. Regarding the exception of no cause of action,
the Supreme Court held that, liberally construed, plaintiff's peti-
tion set forth a petitory action even though it sought relief above
and beyond that normally granted in a petitory action. The ex-
ception was, therefore, overruled.
Regarding the exception of no right of action, defendants
urged that plaintiff stood in the position of a "top" mineral pur-
chaser and a "top" lessee. Thus, it was contended, plaintiff had
only personal rights and was not entitled to assert a real action.
The Supreme Court correctly held that plaintiff's petition re-
flected his claim to be more than a mere "top" mineral owner or
lessee but showed his claim that he was, as of the dates of the
mineral purchase and lease, the owner of those particular inter-
ests free of the prior leases. As alleged owner of a mineral
servitude interest, plaintiff was clearly entitled to assert a peti-
tory action. Regarding his position as a mineral lessee, the court
correctly ruled that plaintiff was similarly entitled to assert the
petitory action. The court's discussion reflects some doubt, ap-
parently stemming from the decision in Reagan v. Murphy,43
that plaintiff as mineral lessee was the owner of a "real right"
entitled to bring a real action. However, even under the law
existing at the time of the decision in Reagan v. Murphy,44 prior
to the adoption of article 3664 of the Code of Civil Procedure,45
42. 249 La. 42, 184 So. 2d 727 (1966). For the decision by the court of appeal
on the merits see 176 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
43. 245 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958).
44. Ibid.
45. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUaE art. 3664 (1960) : "A mineral lessee or sub-
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there could have been no doubt as to the plaintiff's right as a
mineral lessee to bring the real actions. Doubt regarding the
status of a mineral lessee as the owner of a real right has arisen
in numerous contexts, but there has been no question since the
passage of' Act 205 of 1938,46 overruling Gulf Refining Co. v.
Glassell,47 that a mineral lessee is entitled to assert the real
actions.
The objection of nonjoinder was based upon the contention
that the landowner owning the other half of the minerals on
one tract and the lessor from whom plaintiff obtained the lease
on the other were indispensable or, at least, necessary parties
to the action. Plaintiff urged that under R.S. 9:110548 and
article 366449 of the Code of Civil Procedure he was entitled to
assert the real actions "without the concurrence, joinder, or con-
sent of the owner of the land." However, the court ruled that
the landowner and lessor were at least necessary parties to the
action, sustained the exception, reversed the judgments of the
court of appeal and district court, and remanded the case for
trial.
Insofar as the landowner who had retained ownership of
one-half of the mineral rights on one of the two tracts is con-
cerned, the court's decision is questionable. The purchaser of a
fractional mineral servitude does not become a co-owner of the
mineral rights with the landowner who retains the remainder. 50
lessee, owner of a mineral interest in immovable property, owner of a mineral
royalty, or of any right under or by obligation resulting from a contract to re-
duce oil, gas and other minerals to possession, is the owner of a real right. These
rights may be asserted, protected and defended in the same manner as the owner-
ship or possession of immovable property, and without concurrence, joinder, or
consent of the owner of the land."
46. Amended by La. Acts 1950 (2 E.S.), No. 6, now LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
47. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
48. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950): "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and con-
tracts applying to and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas, or
other minerals to possession, together with the rights, privileges, and obligations
resulting therefrom, are classified as real rights and incorporeal immovable prop-
erty. They may be asserted, protected, and defended in the same manner as may
be the ownership or possession of other immovable property by the holder of these
rights, without the concurrence, joinder, or consent of the landowner, and without
impairment of rights of warranty, in any action or by any procedure available
to the owner of immovable property or land. This Section shall be considered as
substantive as well as procedural so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral
leases and contracts within the purpose of this Section shall have the benefit of
all laws relating to the owners of real rights in immovable property or real
estate."
49. See note 45 supra.
50. Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950) ; Clark
v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
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Such a servitude owner acquires a separate and independent
right of exploration. Admittedly, it might be argued that when
a mineral servitude purchaser acquires an interest subject to
a previously granted lease he in effect becomes a co-lessor with
the landowner.5 1 If the obligations of the lease are to be regarded
as indivisible,5 2 it might therefore be said that joinder of the
landowner is necessary. However, the position of the plaintiff
in this case was that as of the date of his purchase of the one-
half mineral servitude the lease in question had expired by its
own terms. This being the case, it seems that the exception of
nonjoinder of the landowner might have been overruled.
Insofar as the exception of nonjoinder affected the landowner
from whom plaintiff had acquired a full interest mineral lease,
it is also questionable whether the ruling was correct. The court
stated that before suit, the lessor "had a fully operative lease on
his land and contractual relations with defendants, who owed
him a duty to fulfill the lease obligations. If plaintiff has
judgment, this lease will be decreed of no effect, and lessor's
rights will be extinguished, despite the express subordination.
The lessor will receive a different lease obligor under another
lease the court will have decreed operative. That the substitute
lease coincidentally provides for identical royalties to the lessor
does not prevent his interest from being affected." 53 If the land-
owner in question had become lessor by purchase of the land
from the original lessor subsequent to the time plaintiff acquired
his lease, the court's analysis might be sound. However, it seems
that any right or interest which the lessor might have had arising
from the fact that judgment in favor of plaintiff would sub-
stitute a new lessee might have been regarded as waived in this
particular case. The lease agreement unquestionably reveals that
the lessor contemplated that if no valid, outstanding lease existed,
he was perfectly willing to accept plaintiff as lessee.
In view of these considerations, it seems that the ruling by
the Supreme Court did little more than delay a decision on the
merits. The court of appeal had rendered judgment on the merits,
noting that it was presented "with a record of a case made up
after trial of all the issues between the parties which is complete
in every respect, ' 54 and further observing that a decision upon
51. See Coyle v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 187 La. 238, 174 So. 274 (1937).
52. Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
53. LeSage v. Union Producing Co., 184 So. 2d 727, 731 (La. 1966).
54. 176 So. 2d 777, 781 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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the merits of the case "will, therefore, serve to prevent addi-
tional delays and expenses without prejudice to the rights of
the parties."' 5 Decision on the exception of no cause of action
was pretermitted and the exceptions of no right of action and
nonjoinder were overruled. Even though some question as to
the correctness of pretermitting an exception might have been
raised, 56 on balance the approach of the court of appeal seems
preferable.
When this case ultimately reaches the point of decision on
the merits, if it climbs back up the appellate ladder, it should
prove interesting as it will require consideration of when unit
operations affecting unitized tracts not including the drill site
are terminated and non-unit operations exploring other sands,
have commenced.
Collateral Estoppel
Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp.57 presented an
extremely interesting question of procedure arising out of a gas
contract dispute. Shell and Texas Gas entered into a contract
in 1951 by which Shell agreed to sell gas at a specified price but
with the protection of a "most favored nation" clause under
which Texas Gas was obligated to escalate the price paid Shell
if, subsequent to execution of the Shell contract, it executed a
contract for the purchase of gas within fifty miles of the Shell
delivery point at a higher price. In 1943 a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Texas Gas had executed a contract with Atlantic Re-
fining Co. for the purchase of gas within fifty miles of the Shell
delivery point. The 1943 contract provided for renegotiation of
the price at five-year intervals or, if negotiation should fail,
arbitration. In 1953, at the end of the second interval, Texas
Gas and Atlantic executed a letter agreement providing for a
price higher than that paid Shell under its 1951 contract. Shell
contended that it was owed the higher Atlantic price for sales
during the period between the 1953 letter agreement and the
date in 1954 when the Federal Power Commission was compelled
by the United States Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction over
field prices for interstate sales by independent producers of
gas.5 8
55. Ibid.
56. In his dissenting opinion Judge Ayres raised the question of the correct-
ness of this practice. Id. at 785.
57. 176 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
58. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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In compliance with FPC regulations requiring submission of
all rate schedules, Shell had submitted its schedule for the field
in question with a statement concerning the escalation accom-
panied by a sample billing under which Texas Transmission was
making its payments under the old contract and a sample as
Shell contended payment should be made based on its contention
that the 1953 letter agreement between Atlantic and Texas Gas
was a "new contract." The outcome of the commission proceed-
ing was ultimately a holding that the letter agreement was not a
"new contract" entitling Shell to the higher rate.59
In the present state court action, Texas Gas pleaded collateral
estoppel. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that although
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not a part of the Louisiana
law of res judicata,60 Louisiana is required under 28 U.S.C.
§ 17381 to give the same effect to the judgments of state and
federal courts as those judgments have in the jurisdictions where
rendered. As the effect of federal judgments in non-diversity
cases is governed by federal law, the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel had to be applied. On original hearing, it was held that ap-
plication of the doctrine required a determination that Shell was
forbidden from relitigating the issue as part of its claim for
the higher rate during the 1953-54 period.
On rehearing, the court held that the prior determination in
federal court rested on the assumption that the 1943 Texas
Gas-Atlantic contract would be valid as a matter of Louisiana
law. The federal decision'held the contract binding even though
it did not establish a definite price but only provided for negotia-
tion or arbitration. Shell contended that the question whether
such a contract would be valid under Louisiana law was one of
59. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 292 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915.
60. Citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870) ; Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76,
75 So. 2d 14 (1954) and other authorities.
61. ".. . Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of the legislature of any State,
Territory or Possession of the United States] or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possesssions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
In support of the proposition that the quoted statutory provision requires each
state to. give the same effect to the judgments of state and federal courts as those
judgments 'have iii the jurisdictions where rendered, the court cited Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165
(1938) and numerous other; authorities. In support of the principle that collateral
estoppel is included within the full faith and credit mandate of the statute, the
court cited United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 825.
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law, to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not ap-
plicable. This contention was sustained, and the case was re-
manded for proceedings consistent with the court's decision. As
the litigation is not terminated, comment on the merits of the
question would be inappropriate. The procedural determination,
however, appears to be correct. 62
Parol Evidence
The stream of recent jurisprudence regarding suits on oral
contracts involving mineral leases was at least negatively in-
volved in Fontenot v. Fontenot 3 Plaintiffs sued to enforce an
alleged oral contract under which defendants, mineral lease
brokers, induced plaintiffs to lease to defendant's principal for
$5.00 an acre by promising that if more was paid to any other
lessor "in the block," defendants would personally pay plaintiffs
the difference. Counsel for defendants urged that under Hayes
v. Muller 64 and other similar cases, parol evidence was inadmis-
sible in proof of the claim. However, the court held that this
suit did not involve a claim of an interest in a mineral lease dis-
puted among parties thereto. The case was analyzed as one in-
volving a disclosed agent who exceeded his authority and thereby
became personally bound. Thus, it was held that parol evidence
was admissible in proof of the claim. However, the triumph on
the legal issue proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for plaintiffs as
the court held that the evidence did not support the alleged oral
agreements. Thus the judgment rendered by the lower court in
favor of defendants was affirmed.
Considering the facts of the case as recited by the court, there
seems little question as to the correctness of the result.
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